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Interest Balancing and Other
Limits to Judicially Managed
Equal Educational Opportunity
by Neal Devins•
Forty years after Brown v. Board of Education,1 the quest for equal
educational opportunity remains elusive. Conservatives and liberals
alike both complain bitterly about court-imposed solutions to racial
isolation. For conservatives, judicial intervention in the name of
equality is counter-productive. Jeremy Rabkin, for example, speaks of
courts, "working with the whimsical imagery of the 1960s," making it
"impossible for [inner city] neighborhoods to cope with the daily assault
on their basic security."2 In sharp contrast, the battle cry from the left
attacks the courts for being too weak-kneed. Gary Orfield, for example,
reported in 1993 that the growing resegregation of African-American
students is attributable to "the development of case law permitting both
the abandonment of desegregation plans and return to segregated
neighborhood schools."3
Erwin Chemerinsky's lament is decidedly (and decisively) of the lefty
variety. Claiming that "equal educational opportunity only had a chance

• Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary.
Georgetown University (A.B., 1978); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1982). This essay is an
outgrowth of my March 1994 presentation at the Mercer Law Review sjmposium on
structural injunctions: Thanks to ·E rwin Chemerinsky for, among other things, providing
me with an excellent point of departure for developing my thinking on the Court's role in
equal educational opportunity. Thanks also to Dave Douglas and Kay Kindred for
comments on an earlier draft. Thanks, finally, to Paul Bader for coordinating this
symposium issue.
1. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
2. Jeremy Rabkin, Racial Progress and Constitutional Road Blocks, 34 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 75, 86 (1992).
3. Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation in American Public Schools: Changing
Patterns ofSeparation and Poverty since 1968, 7, A Report of the Harvard Project in School
Desegregation to the National School Board Association· (December 1993).
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of occurring if the Supreme Court had ruled that inequities in funding
schools are unconstitutional and if it had permitted interdistrict
remedies including both city· and suburban schools," Chemerinsky
"argue[s] that one factor contributing to the failed promise .of equal
schooling was the· decisions of the Burger Court in the 1970s."4 The
consequence of this supposed judicial abdication is that "American
schools are socially segregated and grossly unequal."5
Erwin Chemerinsky is .certainly correct· in concluding that equal
educational opportunity remains an elusive goal. Nonetheless, his proof
of judicial irresponsibility is wanting. While the courts and elected
government could have done more, the differences between the Warren
Court and the "Republican dominated" Burger and Rehnquist Courts are
less extreme than Chemerinsky imagines. The judi~i8ry, including the
exalted Warren Court, ~s 8Iways engaged in interest balancing in
sorting out both the violation and remedy components of school
desegregation litigation. Furthermore, interest balancing is not only
inevitable, it is· healthy. Courts cannot be crusaders without their
decisions becoming stagnant and their credibility diminished. Instead,
courts necessarily function within a "political environment-they affect
and are affected by public policy. "[I]n the realm of race and schooling,"
as David Kirp puts it, "[p]olitics and law ... each reshapes the other.n~~
I.

INTEREST BALANCING AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

The Warren Court
'lbday, it seems inconceivable that in !Jrown the Court's basic
declaration of racial equality tested the limits of judicial authority.When Brown was decided, however, segregation was so ingrained in the
South that the outlawing of dual school systems promised social turmoil
and massive resistance. These deep feelings were not lost either on the
Court or on the Department of Justice. In an effort to temper Southern
hostility, Chief Justice Earl Warren sought to craft a unanimous opinion
of limited reach and the Justice. Department recommended that the
Court not specify a remedy in the case.
Chief Justice Warren's participation in Brown and the corresponding
drive towards unanimity were serendipitous. The Supreme Court was

A.

4. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to Achieve
Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REv. 999, 1000 & 1001 (1994) [hereinafter
ChemerinskyJ.
5. Id. at 999.
6. DAVID KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS 70 (1983).
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set to decide Brown in its 1952 term with Chief Justice Vmson at the
Court's helm.· After briefs were filed (including an important brief filed
by the Justice Department in the last month of the Truman Administration, which argued that racial segregation undermined America's stature
as leader of the free world), and oral arguments were heard, the Court
redocketed Brown so that it ·could also decide the constitutionality of
segregated education in the "federal city," Washington,. D.C. At this
time, the Justices were sharply divided-their December 1952 conference
suggested a 5-4 opiniori (to uphold!) segregated education. As Justice
William 0. Douglas wrote in his autobiography:
It was clear that if a decision had been reached in the 1952 Term, we
would have had five saying that s~parate but equal schools were
constitutional, that separate but unequal schools were not constitutional, and that the remedy was to give the states time to make the two
systems of ~chools equal.7

In 1953, however, Vinson·died and Warren became Chief Justice-an
occurrence prompting Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter to exclaim:
"'[T]his is the first solid piece of evidence I've ever had that there really
is a God.'"8 With Warren now at the helm, the Court, although still
sharply divided, was able to unanimously agree upon a brief declaration
that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal...s After
another year, in which the public had time to contemplate a desegregated country, the Court issued Brown II, 10 declaring that desegregation
must proceed with "all deliberate speed."11
The Court's bifurcation of its merits and remedies holdings, as well as
the absence of judgmental rhetoric in its segregation decision, reveals
that the Justices sought to improve the acceptability of their decision in
Brown I by speaking in a single moderate voice. Indeed, as Sidney
Ulmer's account ofintemal Court deliberations in the writing of Brown
reveals, compromises were made by all nine Justices in order to ensure
unanimity. 12
Brown was a masterstroke for the Court and its architect, Earl
Warren. Inheriting a sharply divided Court on the precipice of
upholding segregated education, the new Chief Justice crafted a

7. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 113 (1980).

8. Philip Elman, The Solicitor Ge~ral's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 1946·1960: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REV. 817,840 (1987).

9. 347 u.s. 483,495 (1954).
10. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
11. Id. at 301.
12. S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689, 693·96
(1971).
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unanimous opinion that· is universally applauded. Robert Bork, for
example, describes Brown as "the defining event of modem American
constitutional law" and "the greatest moral triumph constitutional law
had ever produced." 13
·
Brown is testament not just to the reaches, but also the limits of
judicial action. By taking into account potential resistance to · its
decision, lhe ·Court in Brown engaged in the type of interest balancing
that has set political parameters on judicial intervention in equal
educational opportunity. Noting that "some achievable remedial
effectiveness may be sacrificed because of other social interests" and that
"a limited remedy [may be chosen] when a more effective one is too
costly to other interests,"14 the Court recognized that victim's rights
must be balanced against a broad spectrum of competing policy concerns.
Specifically, aside from victim's rights, the Court in Brown valued local
control of public school systems and judicial restraint. Consequently, in
addition to taking southern resistance into account as a factor in crafting
a remedy that would best serv·e plaintiffs' interests, 16 the Warren Court
slowed· down the pace of school desegregation for other reasons.
This conclusion is subject to criticism, for the Court's failure in Brown
I to specify a remedy or condemn segregation as immoral are easily
explainable as the desire to avoid "the costs that a remedy imposes.·.'.
when such costs actually interfere with the remedy's effectiveness
16
• •••"
Brown II, however, does not lend itSelf to ·such· an interpretation. Rather than require southern systems to take concrete steps ·to
dismantle dual systems, the Court recognized in Brown II that "varied
local school problems" were best solved by "[s]chool authorities," that
district court judges were best suited to examine "local conditions," and
that delays associated with "problems related to administration" were to
be expected. 17 The inevitable ··result of this "remedial" order was
inaction. As J . Harvie Wilkinson put it, "[T]he South was audibly
relieved by Brown II, a victory of sorts snatched from the defeat ofonly
a year ago [in Brown]."18 Indeed, Southern newspapers heralded the

13. RoBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 74, 77 (1990).
14. Paul GeWirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 599 (1983). Gerwirtz's
.
article was especially helpful to me in thinking through this part of the essay.
15. Gerwirtz describes this type of calculation as "rights maximizing." See id. at·58993. Erwin Chemerinsky depicts Warren-era · judicially imposed limits on school
desegregation remedies as 'bei0g"rlghts maximizing." See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at
1000.
.
'
16. Gerwirtz, supra note 14, at 599.
17. 349 U.S. at 299-300.
18. J . Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation,
1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 490 (1978).
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remedial order, especially since the Court entrusted the implementation
of its decision to "[o]ur local judges [who] know the local situation
19
• • • •"
These local judges· did not disappoint segregationists, sometimes because they too opposed Brown and sometimes because they were
hesitant to. fight entrenched local institutions.20
Brown Ii's failure cannot be excused as the best possible remedy in the
face of southern 'resistance'. . The Court's emphasis on local conditions
invited tokenism and delay and southern school officials and judges
acted in kind. The Supreme Court, then, did not seek to provide the
type of leadership against which one can measure changes in blackwhite student contact. Moreover, in the decade following Brown, the
Court's only foray into school desegregation is best understood as the
Warren Court's qefense of its institutional self-interest. Pressed in the
Little Rock case by Arkansas Governor Orval Forbas' efforts to block
school desegregation, the Court aggressively defended its turf, proclaimi;ng itself "supreme in the exposition of th~ law of the Constitution
21
"
Although a more vigorous role in school cases may have
immersed the Court in a thicket that may have otherwise j.eopardized its
social reform objectives in criminal law and elsewhere, it is indisputable
that the Warren Co"Q.rt ducked the school desegregation issue for a
decade. In 1964, the Warren Court finally :recognized that "[t]he time
for mE!re 'deliberate. speed' has run out"22 and, in the 1968 Green v.
County .School BoarcF decision, returned to school desegregation in
earnest, demanding that school boards "~ome forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now:lt24
.
.
The. Warren Court's intransigence on school desegregation spanned
most of its sixteen-y~ar life. Remarkably, one decade after.Brown, only
two percent of bla~k children attended biracial schools in the eleven
southern states.25 In the 1965-66 school year, however, the percentage
of black children in biracial schools rose to six percent.26 The turning
• .

I

'

19. REED SA:im.A'IT, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION 200 (1966) (quoting a southern
attorney). For other comments, see Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 490.
20. ~ GARY 0RFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 154-58 (1969)
(discussing the pressures on southern district court judges in the wake of the Brown II
decision); J.W. PELTAsON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN (19G1) (same).
21. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
~2. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (].964).
23. 391 u.s. 430 (1968).
24. Id. at 439.
25. See Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning
ofthe Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE.DAME L. REv. 1243, 1246 n.6 (1984).
26; See id.
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point here was not hyped up judicial enforcement; instead, the principal
impetus to meaningful school desegregation was rooted in elected branch
·
action.
One explanation for this transformation is Congress' encouragement
of judicial intervention through its 1964 Civil Rights Act27 authoriza·
tion ofDepartment ofJustice participation in school desegregation litiga·
tion.28 Over objections that "[t]his proposal would convert the Depart·
ment of Justice into the legal arm of the NAACP, CORE, SNCC, and
similar unofficial groups,"29 Congress recognized that federal action was
needed to alter the snail-like pace of Southern desegregation. ·More
significant, the implementation of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965,30 coupled with the issuance and enforcement of
guidelines for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, marked a shift in
federal power over state education systems.31 Rather than playing a
minimalist role in helping schools better educate their students, the
federal government became a major player in pushing schools to provide
equal educational opportunity to black children. With Title VI's demand
that federal grant recipients be nondiscriminatory, Congress became
willing to pump billions of dollars of aid for the compensatory education
of educationally deprived children. These billions of dollars were
sufficient incentive for many school systems to comply with the Office for
Civil Rights' nondiscrimination standards'.
It was against this backdrop of increasing federal involvement in
school ·desegregation that the Warren Court stepped up its own
involvement. This parallelism should come as no surprise. With
Congress and the White House both making equal educational opportunity a national priority and envisioning an increasing judicial· role,
concerns oflocal control and judicial restraint no longer impeded judicial
action. Court intervention, instead, was consistent with judicial respect
for the priorities set by co·equal branches of the federal government.

B.

The Burger and Rehnquist Courts
The Warren Court's school desegregation legacy, then, is one· of
visionary leadership and a good dose of caution. Against this backdrop,
Erwin Chemerinsky goes too far in his attack of the Burger Court for
deviating from Warren Court decisionmaking. This, of course, is not to
say that proponents of a vigorous judicial role in equal educa~o~al

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

42 U.S.CA. § 2000c-6 (1994).
78 Stat. 241, 248 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1988)). ·
110 CONG. REC. 8614 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman).
20 u.s.c. § 2701 (1965).
See generally Devins & Stedman, supra note 25, at 1246-51.
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opportunity should not be critical of the Burger Court.32 The Court's
refusal in Milliken I, to include suburban counties in Detroit's school
desegregation plan, despite the Court's recognition that the state of
Michigan was partly responsible . for illegal segregation in Detroit
schools, explicitly placed the interest of local control ahead of equal
educational opportunity.33 Likewise, local control triumphed when the
Court formally ~mbraced in Austin v. United States34 what was implicit
in Keyes v. Denver,35 namely, that a school system may favor neighborhood schools irrespective of ethnically segregated residential patterns
w:hich makes racial isolation "the foreseeable and inevitable result of
.
such an assignment policy."86
Finally, the :J3urger Court removed school finance from judicial
scrutiny, holding in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,37 that a state need not equalize gross differences in perpupil expenditures &,mong school districts. 38 "The effect of Rodriguez,"
as Erwin Chemerinsky aptly put it, "was to institutionalize unequalatives in school funding...s9 In the Court's eye, however, court-imposed
school finance reform "is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower
educational expenditures....ro In reaching the conclusion that property
po_or st~dents are best served by judicial abdication, the Court emphasized "the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function7141-a value· that plays no role in Erwin Chemerinsky's competing
calculus.
The Burger Court's recognition of values outside of equal educational
opportunity, as t.h e Warren Court experience suggests, is inevitable.
This is especially so since four members of the Burger Court (William
Rehnquist, Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, and Warren B\lrger himself)
were appointed by a president, Richard Nixon, who campaigned against
judi~ial activism and for states' rights as part of his "Southern Strategy.1142 Correspondingly, by 1969, unlike the final stages of the Warren

32. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
33. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1010-11.
34. 429 u.s. 990 (1976).
35. 413 u.s. 189 (1973).
36. Uni~ States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 392 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated,
Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.).
37. 411 u.s. 1 (1973).
38. Id.
39. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1009.
40. 411 U.S. at 57.
41. Id. at 58.
42. See LoUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
264-67 (1992).
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Court where "the President, congressional leadership, and the public all
recognized that pr:otection of the rights of black Americans was the
fundamental. [social and educational] issue,JJ43 both the executive and
legislative branches were increasingly found opposing the federal courts
in school desegregation questions. Mounting concern over the extension
of desegregation to districts outside the South, and heightened opposition to the use of mandatory reassignments ("busing"), led to increased
efforts by both branches to curb federal action in school desegregation.'"
Without the support of the coequal branches of government, judicial
intervention was likely to face increasing local resistance. Concerns of
the judiciary's self-interest in having its orders enforced as well as the
respect owed a coequal branch, warranted a diminished judicial role and,
with it, increased attention to judicial restraint concerns.
What then seems remarkable about the Burger Court is its willingness
to enter the school desegregation fray at all. In several instances,
however, the Burger Court did just · that, approving fairly broad
constructs for defining both the scope of the violation and the sweep of
the remedy. In 1971 the Court in, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education45 recognized the use of black-white pupil ratios and
mandatory student reassignments as "starting point[s] in the process of
shaping a remedy ....1146 Although rejecting year-to-year adjustments
and recognizing that changing demographics might result in racial
isolation outside of the courts' equitable authority the Court in Swann
embraced busing as a remedy, and its use of black-white ratios
assumed-for purposes of crafting the initial remedy-that the ~orld is
naturally integrated. That is, absent segregation the world would be
racially balanced: For the Burger Court, to eliminate all vestiges of an
unconstitutional dual school system, desegregation remedies might have
to be "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre
~7

.

Interest balancing played o~y a · minor role .in Swann. While
acknowledging concerns of the health of children from overly long bus
trips, the Court emphasized that the ~ompeting value of desegregation
will almost .always win out. More significant, Swann eschewed local
control, judicial restraint, institutional self-interest in crafting a clearly
workable remedy, and respect for legislative and executive .branch
preferences in favor of massive far reaching judicial intervention.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Orfield, supra note 20, at 39.
See Fisher & Devins, supra note 42, at 264-67.
402 u.s. 1 (1971).
ld. at 25.
ld. at 28.
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Swann was not an anomaly. The Burger Court, in varying degrees,
embraced the naturally integrated model in Keyes v. Denver, Dayton v.
Brinkman II, and Columbus Board of Education v. Penick.48 The Court
in Keyes held that purposeful segregation in a significant portion of a
school district justified a system-wide remedy unless the district can
"satisfy the almost impossible burden of demonstrating that [it] would
have. been segregated regardless of its conduct.""9 Dayton II and
Coiumbus ex:tenqed the Keyes presumption from focusing on the location
of segregation (~egregation in one part ~fa system implying segregation
in other parts of the system) to inquiring about the time of segregation
(segregation at one time implying segregation at other times). 50 After
Dayton II and Columbus, past constitutional violations could serve as a
basis for relief, even though·a plaintiff failed to show any current impact
from that past discrimination.
In Dayton II, Columbus, Keyes and Swann, the Court envisioned a
broad judicial role in school desegregation. While a finding of purposeful
discrimination is a necessary trigger to judicial intervention, the Burger
Court did not endeavor to foreclose judicial intervention in school cases.
That the Burger Court did not go as far .as some would like hardly
bespeaks abdication. Indeed, in another context (employment discrimination lawsuits), the .Burger Gourt foliowed the lead of Keyes' liberal
critics-going well beyond statutory language to allow challenges to
employment. practices that disproportionately impact civil rights
claimants. 61
Another (and final) measure of the Burger Court's acquiescence to
significantj.udicial involvement can be seen in its refusal to resolve early
1980's challenges by school systems (~d the Reagan Justice Department) to continuing judicial supervision of school systems subject to
longstanding desegregation orders. In Estes v. Metropolitan Branch of
NAACP,62 for example, the Burger Court refused to review the Fifth
Circuit's decision to overturn a district court order that had substituted,
in the Dallas system, educational remedies and neighborhood schools for

48. See Neal Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Court's Abandon·
ment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7, 14-25 (1984) (discussing
Keyes v. Denver, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman II, 443 U.S. 526
(1979); Columbus Bd. ofEduc: v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)).
·
49. JAMES BLUMSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN THE DESEGREGATION OF POST-SECONDARY
EDUCATION 11 (1981) (discussing·Keyes, THE POST SECONDARY DESEGREGATION PROJECT,
REPORT II, at 457,413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973)).
50. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 457 (1979).
51. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CML RIGHTS ERA 387 (1990) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
52. 444

u.s. 437 (1980).
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systemwide busing predicated on black-white student population
ratios. 63 Similarly, the Court refused to review the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Kelly v. Metropolitan County Board54 holding that modifications in Nashville's desegregation plan must reflect current black-white
student population ratios, even if such an approach cannot effectively
desegregate the schools and is educationally unsound.55 While too
much should not be read into certiorari denials, 56 the Burger Court's
refusal to reenter the desegregation fray suggests an acceptance-if not
endorsement-of continuing judicial supervision of once segregated
school systems. Specifically, rather than consider alternatives to
mandatory assignments and other intrusive remedies or specify
standards defining the termination of judicial authority in this area, the
Burger Court put those decisions off for another day.
With the Rehnquist Court, that day has arrived. In Board of
Education v. Dowell67 and Freeman v. Pitts,68 the Rehnquist Court has
made clear that federal courts should be willing to terminate desegregation orders, placing increasing emphasis on local control and judicial
restraint and, correspondingly, deemphasizing victims' rights concerns.
In Dowell, pointing to "[c]onsiderations based on the allocation of powers
within our federal system" and extolling the virtues of local control in
"allow[ing] citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allow[ing]
innovation so that school programs can fit local needs,tt69 the Supreme
Court approved Oklahoma City's decision to abandon mandatory
transportation for students in grades K-4. Pointing to an earlier judicial
determination that Oklahoma City schools were racially unitary, not
dual, the Dowell court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
lifting of the desegregation decree required a showing of "grievous
wrong.tt60 Freeman likewise emphasized limits in the courts' remedial
authority and that "[r]etuming schools to the control oflocal authorities
at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true
accountability in our governmental system.'.s1 Upholding district court
authority to relinquish jurisdiction over student assignments,52 despite

53. ld. at 438.
54. 687 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
55. 687 F.2d at 817.
56. On this topic, see Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1227 (1979).
57. 498 u.s. 237 (1991).
58. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
59. 498 U.S. at 248.
60. ld. at 247.
61. 112 S. Ct. at 1445.
62. Id. at 1446.
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the system's failure to fully comply with other features of the original
school desegregation order, the decision in Freeman relieved Dekalb
County of any obligation to address racial isolation caused by changing
demographics. As a result, Dekalb could make use of neighborhood
school assignments, despite the fact that fifty percent of black students
attended schools that were over ninety percent black.63
Victims rights did not figure prominently in the majority's calculations
in either Dowell or Freeman. Unlike Justice Marshall, who emphasized
iD. his Dowell dissent that "the persistence of racially identifiable schools
perpetuates the message of racial inferiority associated with segregation,tt64 the Court in Dowell and Freeman welcomed a diminishing
judicial role to advance the competing values oflocal control and judicial
restraint.
For Erwin Chemerinsky, these cases "reflect the Supreme Court
simply giving up--declaring victory and getting the federal courts out of
the business.~ That conclusion is not without support but too much
should not be read into these court rulings.
To begin with, Dowell and Freeman are subject to narrow interpretation. In Dowell plaintiffs acquiesed to a preexisting unitariness finding.
Freeman, although technically a unanimous opinion, may prove to be a
vulnerable precedent. Four members of the Court called for a searching
judicial inquiry in which the school system bears the burden to "prove
that its own policies did not contributeot66 to either demographic
changes or racial imbalance in the schools. With Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(rather than Byron White) casting the decisive vote in future cases, a
fifth justice will likely subscribe to this approach.67
Dowell and Freeman, moreover, neither require nor encourage district
court judges to terminate school desegregation injunctions. Instead, like
Brown II, these Rehnquist Court rulings empower district court judges
to take local circumstances into account in sorting out whether a school
system has satisfied its desegregation obligations. Along the same lines,
the Rehnquist Court did not interfere with intrusive district court orders

63. Id. at 1445.
64. 498 U.S. at 263 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Letter from Erwin Chemerinsky to Neal Devins, Feb. 15, 1994.
66. 112 S. Ct. at 1457 (concurring opinion of O'Connor, Blackmon, and Stevens).
Justice Souter's separate concurrence likewise argued for a more scrutinizing judicial role.
See 112 S. Ct. at 1454-55.
67. This analysis assumes that Justice Harry Blackmon's replacement, Stephen Breyer,
will adopt Blackmon's scrutinizing approach to school cases.
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requiring, in Yonkers, the building of state-subsidized housingBS and
imposing, in Kansas City,69 a state-wide tax levy.70
Dowell and Freeman also appear less draconian when placed in their
social and political context. With the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan,
the White House proposed and Congress endorsed "new federalism" in
education programs that eliminated targeted funds for minority school
children subject to school desegregation remedies and put in their stead
block grant programs that allowed local school systems to purchase
computers and the like.71 Under the block grant program, as compared
to mid-sixties reform efforts, there is little or no federal leverage on
school district's desegregation practices. Furthermore, · rather than
discounting local control and encouraging judicial intervention, the block
grants initiatives envisioned greater local control and a reduced judicial
role.
Combusting with "New ~ederalism" initiatives, legislative riders as
well as Reagan and Bush Justice Department arguments have emphasized local autonomy and attacked mandatory reassignments. Indeed,
Reagan Civil Rights Division head Brad Reynolds not only refused to
invoke the Keyes presumption but also attacked busing as "dilut[ing) the
essential [national] consensus that racial discrimination is wrong and
should not be tolerated in any form. "72 The Bush Justice Department,
while more moderate in tone, nonetheless argued in Freeman that "'[n}o
single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools.'"73 In addition to Congressional
and Whl~ House opposi~ion to intrusive judicial remedies, opinion polls
suggest that busing is disfavored by the minority community. Rather
than expansive judicial intervention, minority interests typically favor
magnet school ·programs and other education-related expenditures.74
Given the absence of support for mandatory assignments and other
intrusive remedies, it is little wonder that the courts themselves would
tire of continuing judicial supervision of school systems.

68. Yonkers Bd. ofEduc. v. United States, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
69. Kansas City, Mo., School Dist. v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
70. Id.
71. See ge~ro.lly Devins & Stedman, supra note 25, at 1245-57. ·
72. Speech by William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
before the Delaware Bar Association, February 1982, at 9.
73. Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae, 8, Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430
(1992) (No. 89-1290).
74. See Christine H. Rossell, The Conuergence of Black and White Attitudes on School
Desegregation Issues During the Four-Decade Euolution of the Plans, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REv. (forthcoming).
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The fact that the Rehnquist Court was infiuenced by these concerns
is as inevitable as the Warren and Burger Court's recognition of social
and political factors in its equal educational opportunity jurisprudence.
Whether the election of Bill Clinton will affect this dynamic remains to
be seen. As of August 1994, the Clinton adririnistration has left school
desegregation and school finance alone. Congress also remains
disinterred in these matters. Without any push for a greater federal
judicial presence,- the Court is· likely to do little in this area. For Erwin
Chemerinsky, that is ducking the issue by declaring victory. I, however,
would place a less sinister -spin on the evolution of the Court's role in
this area. The Court sought to advance equal educational opportunity
in fits and starts, sometimes-as in Brown I, Swann, and Keyes-moving
aggressively and other times-as in Brown II, Rodriguez, Milliken, and
Freeman-eschewing an activist role. In the end, the Court settled on
a doctrine that roughly matched social and political conditions. Without
question, the Court would have played ·a more aggressive role had the
electorate placed other individuals in the Congress, the White House,
and-through the appointments and confirmation process-on the bench.
But to expect the Court to rise above its surroundings is unrealistic.
Justice Cardozo reminded us that the "great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men, do not tum aside in their course, and pass the
judges by. "75

II. THE COURT IN PERSPECTIVE
Similarities and differences in the decisionmaking styles of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts tell but a small part of the story
of the Supreme Court's role in equal edueational opportunity litigation.
The issue is not simply whether 'interest baland.ng is inevitable.
Questions remain regarding the appropriateness of interest balancing in
school cases arid the possibility that a more activist judiciary would have
eradicated inequality on the basis of race and wealth. Erwin Chemerinsky, while never proclaiming that vigorous judicial intervention will
solve all our schools' ills,76 embraces interventionist judicial strategies
as both appropriate and successful. "Strongly believ[ing] that there was
a meaningful opportunity for judicial action to make Brown'S promise a
reality," Chemerinsky conchides "that this opportunity was lost because
the cases were decided by the Burger Court and not its predecessor."77

75. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
76. Indeed, Chemerinsky recognizes that "[p)erhaps no judicial decisions could have
really made a mf\ior difference in light of the lack of a strong public commitment to equal
schooling." Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1000.
77. Id. at 1001.
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There are two weaknesses in this argument (neither of which,
incidentally, Erwin Chemerinsky disputes). First, interest balancing
seems especially appropriate in school cases. It is impossible to know
what the world would look like absent segregation and judges, therefore,
must engage in quite a bit of speculation both in identifying actionable
segregation and specifying appropriate remedial relief. Second, political
constraints set real limits on the reach of judicial reform. Although
courts are extraordinarily influential, judicial action cannot reorder
society.

A.

The World Absent Segregation
One central inquiry underlies all race discrimination cases, namely,
what would the world look like in the absence of illegal discrimination?
If the world were naturally integrated, statistical imbalance would serve
as proof of discrimination. Moreover, in such a world, expansive raceconscious remedies should be used to ensure "natural" racial balance.
If the world, absent illegal discrimination, were racially imbalanced,
however, reliance on such statistical measures would be inappropriate.
In such a world, proof of discrimination must hinge on evidence that
suggests that existence of some discriminatory animus. . Correlative to
this, judicial remedies in a racially imbalanced world should seek only
to redress the consequences of proven discrimination.
The choice of which model should predominate is ultimately one of
values. Support for each model can be found in court decisions, social
science research, and partisan politics. This makes it impossible the
attainment of a consensus on which model should predominate.
Furthermore, supporters of each model offer persuasive evidence on why
the other model should not be embraced. Proponents of "natural" racial
balance hinge their argument on the inability of proofs of discriminatory
intent to combat race-influenced decisionmaking. Pointing to psychological theories that explain submerged racism as well as the fact that
"there are mental processes of which we have no awareness that affect
our actions and the ideas of which we are aware,"78 numerical proofs
of discrimination are deemed necessary.
It is, however, naive to suggest that discrimination is the sole cause
of racial imbalance. Voluntary and involuntary forces contribute to such
separation. Housing studies suggest that "there is no reason to believe
that the level of residential segregation observed between [blacks and
whites] purely and simply reflects the totality of only one group's

78. Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and the Equal Protection Clause, 39 STAN. L.

REv. 317, 329 (1987).
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demands:"79 Furthermore, at least sometimes, urban white America
has sought a constructive voluntary solution to racial separation.80
Faced with such conflicting evidence, courts must look to other factors
in defining both the wrong and the remedy in school cases. Victims'
rights is one of these values and the one embraced by Erwin Chemerinsky.81 While there is nothing inherently wrong in giving great weight
to victims' rights concerns, it is nonetheless appropriate for judges to
consider judicial restraint, institutional self-interest, respect owed a coequal branch, local control, and the like. That the Supreme Court has
placed less emphasis on victims rights' then is entirely appropriate.

B.

The Limits of Judicial Reform
There is no doubt about the judiciary's profound impact in school
cases. Put simply, courts affect behavior. When court orders result in
new budgeting processes (Boston), the imposition of a state-wide tax levy
(Kansas City), the building of state-subsidized housing (Yonkers), and
the freezing of U.S. Department of Education accounts (Chicago), change
occurs. Furthermore, parents do send their children to private schools
or move to other school systems in response to school desegregation
orders, although there is typically some increase in minority-nonminority
contact in the public schools.82
Erwin Chemerinsky overestimates, however, what courts can
accomplish on their own. In some instances, Chemerinsky is correct.
Judges or court-appointed special masters can work with community
leaders to forge successful desegregation plans.83 In those cases, courts
play an affirmative instrumental role.

79. Lieberson & Carter, A Model for Inferring the Voluntary and Involuntary Causes
ofResidential Segregation, 19 DEMOGRAPHY 511, 524 (1982).
·80. ·See generally Kirp, supra note 6 (describing efforts by some predominantly white
communities to address perceived black needs).
81. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4.
82. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES,
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 274; 280 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989) (state action doctrine studies in light
of flight to private schools); F. WELCH & A LIGHT, NEW EviDENCE ON ScHOOL DESEGREGA·
TION (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1987) (exposure of minorities to white students
increased in 74 of 125 districts studies, although court order prompted decline in the
percentage of white students}.
83. For an optimistic portrayal of special masters, see Curtis J. Berger, Away from the
Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 707
(1978). For a mixed portrayal, see David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company:
Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv.
313 (1981). For a negative portrayal, see Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational
Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1297-302.
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On other occasions, court orders provide little more than pyrrhic
victory for civil rights litigants. When a school system prefers·resistance
to compliance, court action is not likely to succeed. For example; a
recent study concluded that school systems can subvert school desegregation orders by delaying the remedy, devoting fewer resources to
predominately black schools, and aiding white flight and the erosion of
the city's tax ·base.84 Whether successful compromises outnumber
political debacles is an open question. It is clear that co~ can
facilitate success stories, but only when school systems are willing
players.
Chemerinsky, moreover,· does not take into account the ability of
Congress and the White House to stem the tide of judicial reform.
Immediately after Swann, President Nixon delivered a national address
on the evils of busing and proposed legislation making busing a rei;Iledy
of "last resort" for school segregation, to be implemented "only under
strict limitations...as Congr~ss refused to limit court remedial authority,
but numerous restrictions on federal financial support of mandatory
busing and federal advocacy of busing have been en~cted since 1972.86
Recent social science findings speak to the limits of judicial in~rven
tion in both school desegregation and school finance. . In school
desegregation, despite Reagan administration attacks on the. Keyes
presumption and mandatory reassignments, "black students became
more integrated from 1980 to 1988.1187 Moreover, although the Rehnquist Court did not signal the possible demise _o f school desegregation
remedies until 1991, "the proportion of black students in schools with
more than half minority students rose from 1986 to 1991."86 In school
finance, the limits of judiCial intervention are made apparent by "social
science findings showing a lack of correspondence between dollars spent
·
·
and student achievement.1189

84. See PaulL. Tractenberg, The View from the Bar: An Examination ofthe Litigator's
Role in Shaping Educational Re17UZdies, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS 406 (Barbara
Flicker ed., 1990) (summarizing results from survey of plaintiffs' attorney in school
desegregation cases).
85. H.R. Doc. No. 195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); see also Richard M. Nixon, Address
to the Nation on Equal Educational Opportunities and School Busing (March 16, 1972), in
PuBLIC PAPERS OF THE PREsiDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON: CONTAINING
THE PuBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT: 1972 (1974).
86. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 42, at 267-69.
87. Orfield, supra note 2, at 7.
88. ld.
89. William H. Clune, School Finance Reform: The Role of the Courts, 1, Consortium
for Policy Research in Education, (February 1993).
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This evidence does not refute Erwin Chemerinsky's claim that the
courts could have accomplished more in school disputes. A more activist
judiciary certainly would have had a more profound impact. At the
same time, these findings also suggest, as Alexander Bickel put it, that
"[o]nly a reordering of the environment1190 will result in racially
balanced public schools. The fact that courts cannot accomplish such a
task comes as no surprise. The story of school finance and school
desegregation reveals that the judiciary is only a piece in a much larger
mosaic.

III. CONCLUSION
Technically, this essay · is a reply· to Erwin Chemerinsky's Lost
Opportunity: .The Burger Court and the Failure to Achieve Equal
Educational Opportunity. Considerin'g the bleak mes.sage portrayed by
Chemerinsky about the tragedy of gross inequality in our schools and
the unlikelihood of either the judiciary or elected government to respond
to that inequality, it would be nice if this "reply" could offer solid
evidence suggesting Chemerinsky's description of our schools is in error.
Unfortunately, while things may not be quite as bad as Chemerinsky
makes them out to be, gross inequality does exist and it is unlikely to be
corrected.
The courts are a contributing player to this state of affairs. Nonetheless, the courts are hardly the principal player. Without the support of
community leaders and government officials, there are real limits on
what we should expect of courts. The judiciary, while possessing
significant power, cannot unilaterally manage social reform. Furthermore, interest balancing is certainly appropriate here and, more
importantly, suggests that the coUrts should not seek to reshape our
world. None of this is very satisfying but it seems a more realistic
appraisal than that offered by Erwin Chemerinsky.

90. ALExANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 132 (1978).

